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This paper draws connections between Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism, his philosophy of the 
“nearest things” and issues of orientation in contemporary thought. The trajectory which Nietzsche 
traces from “the devaluation of the highest values” to the task of transvaluation, supplies an 
overarching context for addressing nihilism as a crisis of orientation. It is argued that Nietzsche’s   
turn towards the “closest” things as a new direction for thought shares priorities named as the 
“keywords” of our time: “embodiment, affect, the quotidian, singularity, contingency, intimacy, 
precarity” (Laura Marcus, 2016). In order to pursue the deeper implications of this affinity, some 
recent engagement with Nietzsche in new materialist writings are considered. It is claimed that 
Nietzsche’s ideas about the nearest things provide these theories with resources to contest nihilism 
at the level of value, without reinstating an uncritical appeal to the authority of “lived experience.”  
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Amongst the thinkers who have diagnosed the lamentable state of the modern 
world, Nietzsche stands apart as the most extraordinary. How is it, we might ask, that a 
thinker so alert to the intractability of nihilism should be fired with such visionary fervour? 
Nothing seems less likely amidst the defeated spirits and depleted energies of our world-
weary age. Ours is not a time when madmen run into marketplaces and philosophers 
declare themselves dynamite. Here is where it wants to end, we say. It is too late for new 
dawns. The systematic “distraction of thought” by means of which modern cultures “cease 
to be aware of life” has reached its optimum (SE, 4).i  In the age of information technology, 
precarious employment and escalating time poverty, the problem of life’s abiding vacancy 
never emerges. For the human of today, too exhausted to clamour for its chains, even the 
model of the last man seems an aspirational extravagance. In these deeply nihilistic times, 
how does philosophical thought orientate itself?  
When Nietzsche declared in 1888 that he was a “destiny” he named his discovery of 
the life-negating animus of Christian morality as an event without parallel, a real 
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catastrophe: “Anyone who raises awareness about it is a force majeure, a destiny – he 
breaks the history of humanity in two. You live before him or you live after him ..  The 
lightening-bolt of truth has struck precisely what stood highest hitherto” (EH, “Destiny,” 8). 
These lines, like so many from Nietzsche’s corpus, are oft-repeated, the starting point for 
concerted engagement with key ideas: “the death of God”; the advent of European nihilism 
(“the history of the next two centuries”); the eternal return; will to power; and the 
revaluation of all values. To orientate oneself in relation to Nietzsche as a thinker of 
nihilism, typical next steps might include engagement with Heidegger’s monumental lecture 
series or Deleuze’s radicalization of Nietzsche’s thought as Kantian critique in addition to a 
plethora of more recent works in continental philosophy. All of this is very well traversed 
territory, its pathways deeply etched, its landmarks instantly recognized. 
Less well-known, less frequently quoted, are the lines that intersperse Nietzsche’s 
grandiloquent claims to posterity in the final chapter of his final book, “Why I am a Destiny” 
in Ecce Homo: How one becomes what one is (1888). As he builds to the conclusion of the 
work, Nietzsche reiterates that “God” and the “true world” were invented as counter-
concepts to life. Depreciating the only world that exists, they leave no goal or aim to earthly 
reality. He then proceeds to make the additional claim: 
The concepts ‘soul,’ ‘spirit,’ ultimately even the ‘immortal soul,’ were invented in 
order to despise the body, in order to make it sick and ‘holy,’ in order to cultivate an 
attitude of appalling levity towards all things in life which deserve to be treated 
seriously: questions of nutrition and habitation, of intellectual diet, the treatment of 
the sick, cleanliness, and weather! (EH, “Destiny,” 8) 
In these final moments of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche returns to matters which seem to have 
tangential relevance to his philosophical destiny and the advent of nihilism: questions of 
nourishment, hygiene, living space, meteorological conditions. Such commonplace concerns 
are alluded to at several points in Nietzsche’s quasi-autobiographical text, in part to 
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acknowledge the very mundane  factors which “make” one what one is, and in part to argue 
that these “little things” are deprived of purpose, of “reason and task” owing to the 
otherworldly orientation of metaphysical thinking and its concomitant “contempt” for the 
body (EH, “Destiny”, 8). Juxtaposed with the “world-historic” tenor of the vows to explode 
everything that has hitherto been sanctified, these references to such everyday matters 
might be dismissed as merely rhetorical, or, at best, as a materialist riposte to the much 
maligned “idealism,”ii a “view from below,” as it were. Yet, after the devaluation of the 
highest values there can be no mere elevation of the “physical” or the “sensuous” to the 
former position of truth.  In Platonic philosophy and its Judaeo-Christian successors, value is 
exclusively afforded to the “true” world, the “higher” realm of unchanging ideas, in contrast 
to this “apparent” world of becoming, change and passing away. To oppose this glorification 
of the ideal by appealing to the superiority of “matter” or the “body” would be to repeat the 
oppositional logic of negation which is nihilistic as such.iii And in any case, as Nietzsche 
phrases it so succinctly at the close of “How the True world finally became a Myth,” “with 
the true world, we have also abolished the apparent world!” (TI, “True World”). Broad 
daylight but no horizon. If Nietzsche is the most prescient of philosophers it is because he 
detects the ineluctable pull of the abyss.  
How, then, are we to interpret Nietzsche’s appeal to “little things” such as diet, 
climate, and recreation in the context of nihilism: matters which are deemed trivial and 
“indifferent” according to “conventional opinion” (EH, “Clever,” 10)? Acknowledging that 
such preoccupations seem unworthy of a philosopher destined to fulfil “great tasks” (EH, 
“Clever,” 10), Nietzsche asserts in Ecce Homo that these things are “inconceivably more 
important than all that which has hitherto been held in high esteem. It is precisely in this 
quarter that we must begin to learn afresh” (EH, “Clever,” 10). Arguably, in the twenty-first 
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century, something akin to this relearning is underway. In the last two decades, philosophy 
has embraced a range of orientations towards objects, things, and material life,iv leading the 
literary critic, Laura Marcus to name “embodiment, affect, the quotidian, singularity, 
contingency, intimacy, precarity” as “keywords of our time”.v By contrast, in a world 
transformed by global capitalism Nietzsche’s invective against Judaeo-Christian values may 
now seem antiquated. However, in what follows it will be argued that in order to appreciate 
how Nietzsche’s thinking of the “nearest things” offers a new orientation both against and 
within nihilism, this encounter with such values remains surprisingly relevant. Accordingly, 
this essay will begin by briefly outlining Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism as a crisis of 
“orientation,”  going on to situate the nearest things in the context of his elaboration of 
physiology as a new guiding thread for thought. It will then turn to new materialist writing, 
particularly its recent engagement with Nietzsche’s philosophy, in order to pursue the 
deeper implications of his “revaluation of values”. Finally, it will consider how a revaluation 
of the nearest things avoids an uncritical appeal to the authority of lived experience and 
how this rich seam of Nietzsche’s philosophy enables us to understand thought’s affinity 
with more subtle becomings.   
 
1. Nihilism and the Nearest Things 
 
Nietzsche is unshakeable in his conviction that nihilism is rooted in one particular 
interpretation, “the Christian-moral one” (WP 1). The chief advantage of the Christian moral 
hypothesis was that it granted the human being “an absolute value,” anchoring a self-
reflective subject in a mirror-universe of the anthropic ideal.  Christianity died “at the hands 
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of its own morality,” from its own sense of “truthfulness” (WP 1). In the laboratory of 
Christian culture, the forces “cultivated” by morality include veracity. As Nietzsche explains, 
needs for “untruth” “implanted” by centuries of moral interpretation grow self-critical, 
resulting in a fatal antagonism: “not to value what we know, and yet not to be allowed any 
longer to value the lies we should like to tell ourselves” (WP 5). Lacking any sanction after 
the “death of God,” the moral interpretation inexorably unravels, resulting in the 
autoimmune response of “dissolution” (WP 5). As Nietzsche pithily asserts: “The meaning of 
nihilism is that “the highest values devalue themselves” (WP 2).  
This is a familiar story. Cultures lose their ability to make new fictions. Their dreams 
are too wakeful, they fail to deceive. The collapse of the categories by means of which 
humans make sense of existence leads from a corrosive scepticism to a debilitating 
aimlessness. Incapable of believing in the values that it has inherited, the modern human 
being suffers a loss of direction and purpose: “I don’t know where I am; I am everything that 
doesn’t know where it is” (A, 1). This crisis of orientation is vividly depicted in The Gay 
Science in which a “madman” announces the murder of God to an already disinterested 
crowd in a “marketplace.” This famous passage abounds with questions posed by the 
madman who has sensed a seismic shift in the order of things:  
"Where has God gone?" he cried. "I will tell you. We have killed him — you and I. We 
are all his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the 
sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do 
when we unchained this earth from its sun? Where is it moving now? Where are we 
moving now? Away from all suns? Aren’t we perpetually falling? Backward, 
sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Aren’t we straying 
as through an infinite nothing? (GS 125) 
The madman’s words come “too early” for the mocking and apathetic mob, already numbed 
by the false idol of commerce (GS 125). Only slowly will it dawn that the plunge into abyssal 
depths reflects not only a loss of the highest values, but of all coordination.  
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As Daniel Conway remarks, whilst all values are subject to historical devaluation, 
only the devaluation of the highest values is at issue in the “meaning” of nihilism.vi  He 
makes the point that “Oberst [highest] connotes not only a cardinal sense of authority, but a 
spatial one as well – as if our “highest” values were also those most distant from us”.vii 
Traditionally, philosophy has concerned itself with the most “distant” things – immortality, 
the reality of truth and the being of God - neglecting to consider the “closest things, for 
example, eating, housing, clothing, social intercourse” (WS, 5). These latter ideas preoccupy 
Nietzsche in the “middle period” of his writings and are scattered throughout Human all too 
Human (1878), Assorted Opinions and Maxims (1879), The Wanderer and his Shadow (1880), 
Dawn (1881) and The Gay Science (1882). Elaborating on this theme in The Wanderer and 
his Shadow, he deplores the way in which human understanding is “wrongly directed and 
artificially diverted away from these smallest and closest things” (WS 6). Priests, teachers 
and idealists of every kind are held accountable for training the human being to look to 
matters such as the salvation of the soul, the service of the state, advancement of science or 
accumulation of capital. As a result, “most people see the closest things of all very badly and 
rarely pay them any attention” (WS 6). This is significant because Nietzsche claims that 
“almost all the physical and psychical frailties of the individual” stem from the failure to 
attend to the “nearest things” (WS 6).  
To give new attention to the “near” may be construed as a corrective to all variants 
of other-worldly contemplation, a simple appeal to “concrete” reality or the authority of 
lived experience. In this vein Adrian del Caro remarks: “The common sense with which the 
closest things are affirmed speaks for itself. What is real is what is close, verifiable, and an 
individual should be able to make her own determinations on the degree of closeness of all 
things.”viii However, there is no hint in Nietzsche’s remarks that the nearest things are 
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naturally “given” and simply discoverable empirically. In fact, the “common sense” 
assumption that these are merely issues of personal proclivity has the unfortunate 
consequence of ensuring that the closest things are never “made the object of constant 
impartial and general reflection and reform” (WS, 5). Needless to say, these things are no 
longer the same things once the relation to transcendent ideas has been subtracted. We do 
not get a better look at the valley by removing the mountains. Other commentators 
perceive the influence of nineteenth century materialism on Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
summed up in Feuerbach’s famous remark that “man is what he eats”.ix Here again, 
Nietzsche is unambiguous in his condemnation of the prevailing ideology of the natural: 
“For instance, we say ‘we only eat to live’—an abominable lie, like that which speaks of the 
procreation of children as the real purpose of all sexual pleasure” (WS 5). Whether it is a 
question of how one divides the day, with whom we enjoy social intercourse, leisure, 
sleeping or eating,x the human animal is in despicable dependence and bondage to the 
nihilistic wisdom of “doctors, teachers and curers of souls” (WS 5), “the body” a false 
witness to its own most intimate encounters.   
As Nietzsche’s examples reveal, so long as the body is understood in terms of 
biological finality it will be relegated to a mere mechanism for achieving survival functions. 
All the nearest things are subject to this impoverishment because “nihilistic values, values of 
decline, have taken control under the aegis of the holiest names” (A, 6). If the closest things 
are considered at all, it is only in relation to the preservation of the human animal and not 
its excesses of desire, its ardent longings or libidinal expenditure. It is part of our nihilistic 
heritage that we have been disciplined to despise “the present and neighbourhood and life” 
(WS 16). Even the fortunate few who have dwelt in the brighter fields of nature and spirit 
have “inherited in their blood some of this poison of contempt for the nearest things” (WS 
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16). For this reason, the human being has at best only a deceptive “consciousness” of 
“everything nearest [Allernächste] – his own body for example” (KSA 1, 760). Consciousness 
is inherently misleading because it is believed to constitute “the unity of the organism” 
rather than only the latest and least development of the organic (GS 11); as a result, it 
perpetually misreads the evidence of the body. In fact, Nietzsche suggests that the 
conscious ego is only a tool in the service of a greater intelligence and that by far the greater 
number of bodily motions have nothing whatsoever to do with consciousness (WP 676). 
Accordingly, he counsels that the practice of taking the perspective of consciousness as the 
measure of things is a habit to be “unlearned”: 
We learn to think less of all that is conscious: we unlearn the habit of making 
ourselves responsible for ourselves, because, as conscious beings fixing purposes, we 
are but the smallest part of ourselves. Of the numerous influences operating at every 
moment, e.g. air, electricity, we sense almost nothing: there could well be forces 
that, although we never sense them, continually influence us. (WP 676) 
 
Nietzsche maintained that he was sensitive to minute fluctuations in atmospheric 
pressure, particularly electricity in the drifting clouds and that this accounted for much of 
his affliction (KSB 6: 95). Indeed, his voluminous correspondence provides copious examples 
of his obsession with weather, even to the point of reproducing meteorological tables 
detailing sun, rain and degrees of cloud cover in five major Italian cities one January (KSB 8: 
335-336). This is just one of many examples of “little things” that are part of wider systems 
outwith human awareness. To take seriously these little things is not necessarily to become 
more “conscious” of them, especially given the proneness of consciousness to “degenerate” 
interpretation of the body (WP 674). In fact, unlearning the habits of consciousness means 
to question the demands of knowledge, including the very concept of “thingness” itself, 
which Nietzsche insists is merely an invention required by logic (WP 558). Claiming that “the 
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evidence of the body” reveals a “tremendous multiplicity” (WP 518), Nietzsche proposes to 
take the body (der Leib) instead as a new “guiding thread” for thought (WP 518). In speaking 
of der Leib in this way, he marks a distinction between the “living body” and der Körper: the 
body as a mechanical/functional entity. To embrace the living body as a new orientation for 
philosophy is to abandon the assumption that “thinking” originates within a discrete, self-
reflective individual or transcendental subject. Open to the immensity of history, the living 
body is both the preeminent thought of philosophy and the locus of its thinking. 
The human body, in which the whole of the farthest and nearest past of all organic 
becoming reawakens and becomes bodily, through which and beyond which an 
enormous, inaudible stream seems to flow: the living body is a more astounding 
thought than the old “soul”. (WP 659) 
The body is the name for the “materialization” of the most distant and most proximate 
becoming, the ebb and flow of the stream of life. Of the life that streams through this living 
body, only the smallest part attains consciousness. Indeed, Nietzsche speculates that every 
living creature “is constantly thinking but does not know it” (GS 354). Fluid rather than 
cartographic, this astonishing body is immune to the illusion of a clear boundary between 
thought and its primary materiality. It is from here – where we always already were – that 
we are to “learn anew” about the “closest things” although the revaluation of values 
required for this “return to the same place” dissolves the concepts of sameness and 
subjectivity by which any of this could be recognised.   
  
2.  New Materialism 
When Nietzsche wrote in 1888 about the inestimable importance of the nearest 
things he conceded that such matters as food, climate, environment and recreation were 
deemed trivial according to conventional opinion of the day. In our time of impending 
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ecological catastrophe, of a highly vulnerable global food system, and rapid re-engineering 
of human bodies through the insidious creep of biotechnologies, it has never been so urgent 
to engage with the fine detail of the everyday. New materialism is a term describing a cross-
disciplinary endeavour to unsettle long entrenched assumptions about human imbrication 
in the material world.xi Despite its varied and nuanced inscriptions, at its most basic it 
“demands detailed analyses of our daily interactions with material objects and the natural 
environment”xii whilst remaining alert to “the enormous macroscopic impact of myriad 
mundane individual actions”.xiii New materialism also aims “to problematize the 
anthropocentric and constructivist orientations of most twentieth-century theory in a way 
that encourages closer attention to the sciences by the humanities”.xiv Notably, the 
language of new materialism invites a revaluation for thinking as recent developments “call 
upon us to reorient ourselves profoundly in relation to the world, to one another, and to 
ourselves”.xv In short, the challenge is to think about a world/universe in which things do 
not exist “for us”. 
As Diana Coole and Samantha Frost observe in their introduction to New 
Materialisms (2010), there is an apparent paradox in thinking about matter: “as soon as we 
do so, we seem to distance ourselves from it, and within the space that opens up, a host of 
immaterial things seems to emerge: language, consciousness, subjectivity, agency, mind, 
soul; also imagination, emotions, values, meaning, and so on”.xvi They go on to note that 
these have “typically been presented as idealities fundamentally different from matter and 
valorized as superior to the baser desires of biological matter or the inertia of physical 
stuff”.xvii It is these idealist assumptions “and the values that flow from them,” that 
materialism has traditionally contested.xviii Buoyed by the conviction that “to depart from 
the prioritization of the subject breaks through anthropocentrism,”xix new materialist theory 
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typically exhibits “antipathy towards oppositional ways of thinking.”xx A further 
characteristic of the new materialists is “their insistence on describing active processes of 
materialization of which embodied humans are an integral part”.xxi Forces, energies and 
intensities rather than substances have become the new currency.xxii  
The parallels between this new orientation for thinking and Nietzsche’s conception 
of the “guiding thread of the body” are marked. In a gesture which emphasises the 
continuity between the body and the world, new materialist philosophies tend to posit a 
“multiply tiered ontology” in which there is “no definitive break between sentient and 
nonsentient entities or between material and spiritual phenomena”.xxiii For example, Diana 
Coole reconfigures agency as a complex of “agentic capacities” distributed across a 
spectrum of processes. The latter range from the pre-personal and non-conscious to the 
interpersonal and transpersonal.xxiv As Ali Beheler has recently commented, “Coole’s image 
of a spectrum of agentic capacities provides a fecund frame for Nietzsche’s disparate 
accounts of agency and the emergence of subjectivity”.xxv Indeed, in discussing how “life 
forces” achieve embodied, agentic form Coole cites Nietzsche as a key thinker.xxvi Agentic 
capacities are processes or qualities involved in actions which do not presuppose self-
consciousness as a point of origin and are “only contingently, not ontologically, identified 
with rational, individual agents”.xxvii In multiple places in his writings, Nietzsche describes 
how such non-cognitive, pre-personal bodily processes help to structure perception and 
somatic orientation, despite the prevalent belief that actions are “caused” by human willing.  
Despite this kinship, there has been relatively little new materialist involvement to 
date with Nietzsche’s philosophy, although the work of Gilles Deleuze has lent a Nietzschean 
inflection to the evolving field. Two notable exceptions are Jane Bennett and Melissa A. 
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Orlie - both contributors to Coole and Frost’s New Materialisms. In her Deleuzian-inspired 
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (2010), Jane Bennett argues that the “habit” of 
dividing the world in to dull matter and vibrant life contributes to neglect of “the vitality of 
matter and the lively powers of material formations”.xxviii Ascribing agency to inorganic 
phenomena such as food, refuse and the electricity grid, Bennett seeks to focus attention on 
the active powers of non-subjects. Her working hypothesis is that the figure of an 
intrinsically inanimate matter is one of the impediments to the emergence of more 
ecological and more materially sustainable modes of production and consumption, her 
guiding question being to ask how political responses to public problems would change if 
the capacities of non-human things were taken seriously.  
To this end, Bennett sees Nietzsche as a philosopher who “believed that food had 
the power to shape the dispositions of persons and nations”.xxix  She cites with approval 
Nietzsche’s various ruminations on alcoholism, vegetarianism and stimulants of various 
kinds (“coffee spreads darkness”). Here, as elsewhere, the arguments she references attest 
to the interaction of multiple “actants” or agentic capacities. On her reading, Nietzsche 
“gestures towards the agency of the food-person-sound assemblage” in his discussion of 
anti-Semitism’s hold on Bismark’s Germany with beer, newspapers, politics and Wagnerian 
music cited as the salient diet.xxx Further, she notes that for Nietzsche foods “co-act” with 
“intensities often described as perception, belief and memory” and warns against imagining 
these latter as higher forms. Indeed, she quotes Nietzsche’s assertion from Ecce Homo that 
matters such as nutrition, place and climate, are “inconceivably more important” than all 




But there is .. a sense in which Nietzsche imagined the assemblages of consumption 
as issuing in calculable rather than emergent outcomes, outcomes whose 
predictability increases as one’s knowledge of the system becomes more detailed, 
up to the minute and comprehensive. Nietzsche tended to slip back in to a 
mechanistic model of physiology.xxxii  
This criticism is not contextualised in Bennett’s book although the probable target is 
Nietzsche’s reading of Luigi Cornaro’s La vita sobria (The Temperate Life) in the section “The 
Four Great Errors” in Twilight of the Idols. There, Nietzsche declares that the celebrated 
Italian “saw in his diet the cause of his long life: while the prerequisite of long life, an 
extraordinarily slow metabolism, a small consumption, was the cause of his meagre diet” 
(TI, “Errors,” 1). According to Bennett, Nietzsche complains that Cornaro’s regimen only 
enhances the vitality of certain bodies and that his diet “does not fit all”.xxxiii This is a 
somewhat peculiar interpretation of the Twilight of the Idols passage since the case of 
Cornaro is used by Nietzsche to exemplify “the error of mistaking cause for consequence,” 
an error that is “among the most long-standing and recent of humanity’s habits: it is even 
sanctified by us and bears the name ‘religion,’ ‘morality’” (TI, “Errors,” 2). That Cornaro’s 
diet would not suit all is not the point of the example. Rather, Nietzsche maintains that 
Cornaro was not free to eat a little or a lot. His diet was not a causal “agent” in this sense: 
his frugality was not an act of “free will”.  
Implicitly, Bennett shares Nietzsche’s view that the concept of causality presupposes 
the containment of “matter” within an anthropocentric model of knowledge, structured 
according to regularities of subject and object, doers and deed. Why then, should she 
mistake Nietzsche’s argument as a mechanistic one when she reads his remarks on 
Cornaro? The answer perhaps lies in her assumption that the role of the nearest things in 
Nietzsche’s work is analogous to that of Cornaro: “Do this and that, stop this and that – then 
you will be happy! Or else ..” (TI, “Errors,” 2). This says Nietzsche, is the “most general 
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formula underlying every religion and morality” and is a deeply engrained habit of thought 
(TI, “Errors,” 2). To construe Nietzsche’s remarks about diet as prescriptive is to continue to 
perceive the nearest things on a model of the “farthest things”. It is to perpetuate the 
nihilistic moral imperatives of the priest. Despite Nietzsche’s eclectic musings on doughy 
German pastries and the optimum time to drink tea, to consider the nearest things is not to 
confirm what we think we already know.  
Nietzsche’s aim when discussing Cornaro’s diet is to show how the subject “Cornaro” 
is produced by a particular physiology and that it is illusionary to assume that Cornaro is an 
agent who prescribes a “general formula” for happiness. The argument is rather that a well-
constituted, “happy” person “carries over the order of which his physiology represents into 
his relations with people and things” (TI, “Errors,” 2). Nietzsche says that this inversion is a 
first example of his “revaluation of values” (TI, “Errors,” 2). All phenomena are produced by 
physiologies within which certain value judgments have been incorporated and have 
become instinctive. It is for this reason that that they are so resistant to change. For good 
measure, it should be added here that Nietzsche underlines the point that “habituation to a 
certain causal interpretation” obstructs and even prohibits investigation of causation (TI, 
“Errors,” 4), a point which Bennett’s reading appears to bear out. 
Despite a superficial resemblance, then, Jane Bennett’s writings on edible matter do 
not illuminate Nietzsche’s nearest things as a new orientation for thought. In fact, insofar as 
her recourse to Nietzsche is part of a broader ethical project to “reorient our own 
experience of eating” through recognition of the “agency of food” it attributes political 
power to a fairly familiar deliberative origin and humanist agenda: if “an image of inert 
matter helps animate our current practice of aggressively wasteful and planet endangering 
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consumption, then a materiality experienced as a lively force with agentic capacity could 
animate a more ecologically sustainable public”.xxxiv It must be emphasised here that other 
new materialist writers have also identified this weakness. For example, similarly sceptical 
about the wider potential of Bennett’s project to effect change, Diana Coole has declared 
that any individual ethical stance must be inflected with a greater awareness of systemic 
constraint since most of the objects that we encounter in a twenty-first century context 
have been commodified and are bound up in complex, competitive markets:  
In other words, without a better understanding and critique of the circuits through 
which matter flows – that is, an empirical, scientific and political investigation – it is 
difficult to appreciate the damage and challenges current forms of production and 
consumption involve or to think realistically about ways materially to transform 
them.xxxv  
 
It will not escape the notice of a Nietzschean reader that the values informing 
Coole’s commentary raise issues of their own about “power”. For example, one might wish 
to subject the authority of “empirical, scientific and political values” to genealogical critique 
in relation to the “investigation”. Equally, questions might be posed about the conception of 
matter as something which “flows through circuits,” as if receiving its impress from forces 
extraneous to it. To speak of the “conduits and networks through which matter passes as it 
is transformed, given surplus value, degraded, rerouted, hoarded and so on,”xxxvi is to persist 
with the idea that “value” is something to be determined from “without”. Thus formulated, 
matter continues to be seen in idealist terms as quiescent, lawful and fundamentally 
different in kind to creative God-like beings who, somehow immune to flows of dissolution, 
infuse it with meaning. 
A similar tendency is discernible in Melissa A. Orlie’s reading of Nietzsche’s 
“impersonal materialism,” in her contribution to Coole and Frost’s New Materialisms 
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volume.xxxvii Orlie notes that once we acknowledge that “we are formed by material 
conditions not of our making” it is a struggle “to explain how our values and views are not 
simply determined by forces outside our control”.xxxviii Identifying the will to power with 
impersonal “competing drives and passions,” she suggests that for Nietzsche our freedom 
and creativity are exercised when we recognise our “spiritual fate” as “the accidental, 
meaningless, raw material out of which we can make virtues and values”.xxxix As we have 
just noted in relation to Diana Coole’s work, there is an implicit assumption in this kind of 
statement that “pure” matter is an object or resource for consciousness and that values are 
the exclusive property of human agents.  
Yet there is a further point to be made here about the precise nature of these values. 
Elaborating upon Nietzsche’s claim that “by far the greatest part of the mind’s activity 
proceeds unconscious and unfelt” (GS 333) Orlie suggests that self-understanding begins 
when we learn to “do justice” to drives in “our warring depths”.xl In her interpretation this 
means granting that “our drives and instincts .. all require their due”.xli She maintains that 
“each instinct has some rightful claim to be experienced in awareness”xlii and that “obscure 
impulses which are not given their due and incorporated into conscious awareness” will 
seek to “undermine other instincts and diminish the energy” of that which we 
conventionally call our self.xliii Not only does this presume that the ultimate fate of 
unconscious drives is to be delivered over to consciousness (“the smallest part of 
ourselves”), it is also taken for granted that democratic ideals of justice will prevail over 
unruly matter that threatens to disobey. For example, Orlie asserts that cultivating 
enhanced receptivity to our experiences is required since it is “only by opening the self in 
this way that we might hope to achieve some just and orderly behaviour of the drives in 
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relation to one another”.xliv How “we” could “do right” by all the drives in this way is never 
explained but the more pressing question is why we should aim to do so:  
The trouble with the narrowing of our experience is that it blocks energy for 
evaluation and action and thereby restricts our capacity to judge and act. And 
sustaining the capacity for judgement and action in the face of nihilism is the main 
problem Nietzsche sees confronting us.xlv 
Orlie’s argument is highly germane to our present discussion because it acknowledges that 
impediments to action or change are often unconscious. The irony here is that the capacity 
to act “in the face of nihilism” is programmed by values that are themselves part of our 
nihilistic inheritance: the ideology of propriety, individualism and the refusal of the 
impersonal.  
In this connection, it is worth mentioning that the idiom of “giving things their due” 
is also to be found in the work of Jane Bennettxlvi and Diana Coole.xlvii To “give something its 
due” is to recognise rights, particularly in the context of payment for what is owed: to give 
“credit” or recompense. There is an economic model of contractual relationship 
underpinning this expression which reflects the prevailing ideology of the market. This is 
scarcely fortuitous given the genealogy of the modern subject as one who will be held 
accountable for debt as outlined in the Second Essay of On the Genealogy of Morals. That 
human beings should take responsibility for reckless plundering of the natural world is not 
in dispute here. Rather, the point is that the unconscious values underpinning our thinking 
have a physiological legacy. According to Nietzsche, painful mnemotechnics are involved in 
the evolution of the human subject as an animal bred to remember promises. Corporeal 
memory develops in the bodies of debtors as a result of a history of creditors inflicting 
tortures upon their flesh as recompense for failure to yield the repayment that was due (GM 
4-5).xlviii “Guilt” as a moral value thus has a non-moral origin in the dark history of the living 
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body. A further genealogical question suggests itself: To what extent is the idea of giving 
matter “its due” embedded in a vocabulary symptomatic of depleted physiological 
conditions? In other words, is this thinking still “indebted” to Platonic-Christian values?  
The force of Nietzsche’s appeal to the “near” is to show that thought is not 
independent of the material conditions which give it shape. The suspicious Nietzschean ear 
discerns Platonic-Christian values at work in Orlie’s view that it is both possible and 
desirable for consciousness to marshal “just and orderly behaviour” of the drives as if “we” 
philosophers were missionaries venturing into the Dark Lands of the body to redeem the 
poor benighted drives, those cave-dwellers of physiology. In this regard it might be added 
that there was never any crisis or collision of values between globalising, proselytising 
Christianity and globalising proselytising capitalislm. Both operate with the values of slave-
morality: the nihilistic values of decline. Both deal in the illusion of “rational and freely 
choosing subjects” who are responsible for their debts, both figure desires as needs or lack 
and subordinate the good to utility, efficiency and function. 
 
Nietzsche’s contention that our most inveterate habits of thought, sensation, and 
evaluation have been bred into the flesh and bone and nerves of “the human” for more 
than twenty centuries means that any attempt at a revaluation of values cannot be achieved 
by mere resolve. If philosophy has been corrupted by “theologian blood” (A, 10) and if 
inherited contempt for the little things courses through our veins (WS 16), it is not enough 
to move beyond anthropocentric forms of thinking to counter our nihilist inheritance. With 
respect to cultural change, Nietzsche insists that a “mere disciplining of feelings and 
thoughts” counts for almost nothing: “one first has to convince the body” (TI, “Expeditions,” 





With the horizon of meaning washed away and no more stars to sail by, it is not odd 
that the human should seek refuge in the Platonic-Christian values in which for so long it has 
been islanded. After all, on Nietzsche’s account, the human animal has been formed as a 
“reactive” subject, bred to resist that which threatens its preservation. The new materialist 
vocabulary of thought represents an invigorating alternative to the nihilistic architecture of 
hierarchical, “two world” metaphysics but the examples we have discussed remain 
beholden to this inheritance at the level of value. Despite the clear affinity between new 
materialist theories and Nietzsche’s thinking of the “near,” some proponents of the former 
continue to presuppose that values are discrete items of human judgment: terms to be 
applied to a sensuous, physical world essentially different in “kind”. Insofar as this preserves 
the anthropic ideal of the rational, judging agent it remains bound up with nihilism. The 
crushing sense of futility that is the bane of our times is fuelled by a misplaced faith in the 
otherness of matter and the “given,” the resulting inertia a consummate example of the 
confusion of consequence with cause. 
A new orientation to “our” world, to life, is achieved by recognising values as 
constitutive of phenomena and not ancillary to them. The separability of “values” from their 
material conditions is a theological prejudice: the principle that “the things of the highest 
value must have another origin of their own” (BGE 2). According to Nietzsche, nihilism is 
reached at the point when all one has left are “values that pass judgment” (WP 37): 
“detached and idealistic values, instead of dominating and guiding action, turn against 
action and condemn it” (WP 37). The “nearest things” are a persistent, perhaps, 
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embarrassing reminder of our community with base matter. Indeed, everything that 
suppresses and denies this continuity is intrinsically valorised, hence the excessive 
privileging of consciousness, thought and language.  
Never simply nor solely the originator of values, the human is a channel “through” 
which values are articulated. In a provocative formulation, Nietzsche suggests that “When 
we speak of values we speak under the inspiration of life, from the perspective of life; life 
itself evaluates through us when we establish values” (TI, “Morality” 5). From this it follows 
that even a counter concept to life such as “God” is only a value judgement on the part of 
life, in this case, “declining, debilitated, weary, condemned life” (TI, “Morality” 5). To the 
extent that Nietzsche thinks of life in “physiological” terms, it is the formative interplay of 
material forces that “produce” value insofar as they give rise to phenomena. Indeed, this is 
how “nature” becomes “naturalised”: formed and enforced according to dominant 
orientations.  In this sense his philosophy is a fundamental revaluation of values, with the 
logic of Platonism being seen as one aspect of life, rather than the overarching structure 
within which life is situated. 
As we have seen, in order to situate Nietzsche’s appeal to the “little things” in Ecce 
Homo a rethinking of the body is required. This is not simply to emphasize the primacy of 
formative forces (“becoming”) but to appreciate the primacy of value in terms of conditions 
for life. In an intriguing note, Nietzsche writes: “The point-of-view of “value” is the point-of-
view constituting the preservation-enhancement conditions with respect to complex forms 
of relative duration of life within becoming” (WP 715). The essence of this dense idea is 
elaborated more fully in Beyond Good and Evil in which Nietzsche declares that ““Behind all 
logic .. and its apparent autonomy there stand evaluations, in plainer terms, physiological 
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demands for the preservation of a certain species of life” (BGE, 3). Nietzsche critically 
interrogates phenomena that turn against life but he sees them as wholly immanent to life 
and in some senses as necessary. This is significant because it means that our ability to 
“incorporate” [einverleiben] new values – to “in-body” them - is shaped by our history, by 
what we have become.  
Accordingly, the vital task of revaluation is to wrest free from our nihilist “European” 
endowment: to triumph over “the sum of the imperious value judgments that have become 
part of our flesh and blood” (GS 380). Such labour is at the edge of the thinkable because it 
compels a vital transformation in relation to one’s “own” physiology: one must “overcome” 
the times in oneself.xlix Nietzsche writes in The Antichrist: “Let us not underestimate the fact 
that we ourselves, we free spirits, are already a “revaluation of all values”, an embodied 
[leibhafte] declaration of war on and victory over all old concepts of “true” and “untrue” (A, 
13). No metaphor is intended here. Nietzsche’s claim is that in order to wage war against 
nihilism, the matter of thought must change. Our habits of thought are part of this “matter,” 
perhaps the “nearest”. 
 As we have already noted, for Nietzsche the human body is that in which “the whole 
of the farthest and nearest past of all organic becoming reawakens and becomes bodily” 
(WP 659). The accumulated habits that materialize as living history are holding patterns that 
structure experience but the sediment also shifts and stirs within “an immense inaudible 
stream” (WP 659).  The nearest things are the constant and immanent stabilizing forces that 
Nietzsche explicitly identifies as the “the root [Wurzel] of habits” (KSA, 9, 11 [167], p.506)l, 
the material conditions that form the limits of the seemingly “given”.li In a note from 1881lii, 
which counsels beginning with “the smallest of the nearest things,” Nietzsche reflects on the 
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“the whole dependence in which one is born and raised,” including “the familiar rhythms” of 
our thinking and feeling, of our “intellectual needs and means of nutrition” (KSA 9: 13[20]). 
To this embodied normativity he proposes “Experimentation with change, first breaking 
with familiar things, (e.g. diet)” in order to test oneself against antagonist forces: to try and 
live and “travel” in these flows (KSA 9: 13[20], p.621-622). 
Nietzsche’s appeal to the nearest things provides rich resources to reorient 
engagements with nihilism because it redirects critical attention to the constant – and thus 
constantly overlooked – rhythms of thought and life. What is most proximate, closer than 
air, is habitualization to a style of thinking. Fundamental to nihilism, to both loss of “ground” 
and to any countermovement, is the “unlearning” of deeply rooted habits. Nietzsche 
acknowledges that “there are moments when we cannot subdue that absurd impulse that is 
called ‘idealism’” (WP 16), not least because our “feelings about value judgments” may well 
express conditions of preservation and growth that belong to times long gone by (WP 110).  
This is why the imperative is to examine and question, not to prescribe and decree.  
 This is also why turning to the nearest things is not to appeal to how things really 
“are”. Nietzsche’s identification of the living body as the basis of all rationality and value 
does not entail any ascension “above” that base. Experimenting with habits will have effects 
not just on our understanding but on our intimate, quotidian and affective experience. 
Beyond the lures of the distraction industries and the homogenizing tendencies of the 
markets, there are multiple counter currents at play: “We have to learn to think differently – 
in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently” (D, 103). In this 
sense, when Nietzsche advocates paying attention to the seemingly insignificant details of 
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life, his call is to unlived experience – to the streams that exceed what we can order and 
contain, and which “very late on” we may come to feel. 
i I have used the following editions of Nietzsche’s texts (English translations slightly modified): “Schopenhauer 
as Educator” in Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); 
Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982); Human, All Too Human, vol. 1 and vol. 2 (including The Wanderer and His Shadow), trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986;  The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Random House, 1974); Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1973; On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, trans. Douglas Smith,  (Oxford University Press, 1996);  
The Anti-Christ, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Ecce Homo: How One 
Becomes What One is, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 2007); The Will to Power, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, (Vintage: New York, 1968); Friedrich Nietzsche: Sämtliche Werke. 
Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin: dtv and Walter de Gruyter, 1967–77 and 1998); 
Friedrich Nietzsche: Sämtliche Briefe. Kritische Studienausgabe, 8 vols., ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin: 
dtv and Walter de Gruyter, 1975–84);  
ii Nietzsche writes to Malwida von Meysenbug on October 20, 1888, “Every sentence of my writings contains 
a contempt for idealism” (KSB 8, 458).  
iii For this reason, Heidegger declares that Nietzsche regards nihilism “as the “inner logic” of Western history” 
(“The Word of Nietzsche ‘God is Dead’” (1952) in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977) 
translated by William Lovitt, (New York: Harper and Row, 53-112), 67. 
 
iv A vast literature on “objects” and “things” has dominated approaches to material culture in recent years. 
Suffice it to say that in a range of different theoretical positions such as “thing theory,” “vibrant materialism” 
and “object orientated ontology” the accent falls on displacing the human as the focal point for thinking.  
 
v Laura Marcus, “Autobiographical returns,” Textual Practice, Vol 30, no. 7, 2016, 1160-1161, 1161. 
vi Daniel Conway, “Revisiting the will to power: Active nihilism and the project of transhuman philosophy” in 
Keith Ansell Pearson, and Diane Morgan (eds), Nihilism now! Monsters of Energy, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2000, 117-141), 122. 
vii Conway, ‘Revisiting,’ 121. 
 
viii Adrian del Caro, Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric of the Earth, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 216. 
 
ix Julian Young, Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
282. 
x Nietzsche lists a range of modes of living in WS 5 and 6. See also the list he supplies under the heading 
“Doctrine of the Nearest Things” in the Nachlass: “Division of the day [..], food, company, nature, solitude, 
sleep, employment, education (original and foreign), use of mood and atmospheric conditions, retreat from 
politics. (KSA 8: 40 [16], p.581) 
 
xi   Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, Samantha (eds) New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics. 
(Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2010), 6: “As critically engaged theorists, we find ourselves 
compelled to explore the significance of complex issues such as climate change or global capital and 
population flows, the biotechnological engineering of genetically modified organisms, or the saturation of our 
intimate and physical lives by digital, wireless, and virtual technologies. From our understanding of the 
boundary between life and death and our everyday work practices to the way we feed ourselves and recreate 
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or procreate, we are finding our environment materially and conceptually reconstituted in ways that pose 
profound and unprecedented normative questions”.  
 
xii Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, p.4. 
xiii Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, 16. 
 
xiv Christopher N. Gamble, Joshua S. Hanan, Thomas Nail, “What is New Materialism?” Angelaki: Journal of 
theoretical humanities, Vol. 24, Issue 6, 2019. 111-134, 111. 
xv Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, 6. 
 
xvi Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, 1-2. 
 
xvii Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, 2. 
 
xviii Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, 2. 
 
xix Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin. New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies. Michigan: Open 
Humanities Press, 2012) 162. 
 
xx Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, 8. 
 
xxi Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, 8. 
 
xxii Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, 13. 
 
xxiii Coole and Frost, New Materialisms, 1. 
 
xxiv Diana Coole, “Rethinking agency: A phenomenological approach to embodiment and agentic capacities,” 
Political Studies, Vol. 53, 2005, 124-142, 128: “In proposing a spectrum of [..] qualities I am suggesting breaking 
down the notion of agency into a series of contingent phenomena in order to describe their provisional 
emergence, as well as to reflect upon the agentic propensities of a variety of processes at different levels of 
(co-)existence. At one pole I envisage pre-personal, non-cognitive bodily processes; at the other, 
transpersonal, intersubjective processes that instantiate an interworld. Between them are singularities: 
phenomena with a relatively individual or collective identity whose provisional forms and activities come 
closer to modernity’s sense of agency without coinciding with it.”  
xxv Ali Beheler, “The Body as a Guiding Thread: New Materialist Conceptions of Agentic Corporeality and 
Nietzsche’s Emergent Subject,” Philosophy Today, vol. 65, Issue 1, Winter, 2021, 69-88, 71. 
xxvi Coole, “Rethinking”, 132. 
 
xxvii Coole, “Rethinking”, 125. 
 
xxviii  Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 
2010), vii. She comments: “By ‘vitality’ I mean the capacity of things – edibles, commodities, storms, metals – 
not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with 
trajectories, propensities or tendencies of their own” (viii). Her examples of “vibrant matter” include “the way 
that omega-3 fatty acids can alter human moods” and the generation of “lively streams of chemicals and 
volatile winds of methane” from refuse landfill sites (vii). 
xxix Bennett, Vibrant, 43. 
 
xxx Bennett, Vibrant, 45. 
 
xxxi Bennett, Vibrant, 45. 
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xxxiii Bennett, Vibrant, 44. 
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xxxv Diana Coole, “Agentic capacities and capacious historical materialism: Thinking with new materialisms in 
the political sciences,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 41, Issue 3, 2013, 451-469, 463. 
Similarly Thomas Lemke in “An alternative model of politics?: Prospects and problems with Jane Bennett’s vital 
materialism,” Theory, Culture, Society, vol. 35, no. 6, 2018, 31-54, 47, has maintained that Bennett’s 
“affirmation of the ‘vitality of things’ is counterproductive as it tend to obscure processes of power”. 
  
xxxvi Coole, “Agentic Capacities” 456. 
 
xxxvii Melissa A. Orlie, “Impersonal Matter” in Coole, Diana & Frost, Samantha (eds) (2010) New Materialisms: 
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